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Abstract. In the United States as in other countries, political and
economic divisions cut along geographic and demographic lines. Richer
people are more likely to vote for Republican candidates while poorer
voters lean Democratic; this is consistent with the positions of the
two parties on economic issues. At the same time, richer states on
the coasts are bastions of the Democrats, while most of the generally
lower-income areas in the middle of the country strongly support Re-
publicans. During a research project lasting several years, we reconciled
these patterns by fitting a series of multilevel models to perform infer-
ence on geographic and demographic subsets of the population. We
were using national survey data with relatively small samples in some
states, ethnic groups and income categories; this motivated the use of
Bayesian inference to partially pool between fitted models and local
data. Previous, non-Bayesian analyses of income and voting had failed
to connect individual and state-level patterns. Now that our analysis
has been done, we believe it could be replicated using non-Bayesian
methods, but Bayesian inference helped us crack the problem by di-
rectly handling the uncertainty that is inherent in working with sparse
data.
Key words and phrases: Multilevel regression and poststratification
(MRP), political science, sample surveys, sparse data, voting.
1. INTRODUCTION
Income and economic redistribution are central to
electoral politics. In the United States as in other
countries, political and economic divisions cut along
geographic and demographic lines. Richer people
are more likely to vote for Republican candidates
while poorer voters lean Democratic; this is consis-
tent with the positions of the two parties on eco-
nomic issues. At the same time, richer states on the
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coasts are bastions of the Democrats, while most
of the generally lower-income areas in the middle
of the country strongly support Republicans. This
geographic pattern is consistent with the sense of
a culture war between richer, more socially liberal
cosmopolitans and middle-class proponents of tra-
ditional American values.
These statistical patterns of voting at the individ-
ual and group level are central to political debates
about economic and social polarization. During a re-
search project lasting several years, we resolved the
statistical questions by fitting a series of multilevel
models to study the differences in voting between
rich and poor voters, and rich and poor states. We
were using national survey data with relatively small
samples in some states, ethnic groups and income
categories; this motivated the use of Bayesian in-
ference to partially pool between fitted models and
local data.
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Previous, non-Bayesian analyses of income and
voting had failed to connect individual and state-
level patterns. Typical analyses would be either at
the individual or the aggregate levels but not both.
In the studies that did model voting based on indi-
vidual and geographic characteristics, the focus was
on estimating some particular regression coefficient
(or, more generally, on identification of some aver-
age causal effect). Classical statistics tends to fo-
cus on estimation or testing for a single parameter
or low-dimensional vector, whereas Bayesian meth-
ods work particularly well when the goal is infer-
ence about a large number of uncertain quantities
(in this case, coefficients within each of the fifty
states).
Now that our analysis has been done, we believe
it could be replicated using non-Bayesian methods:
that is, with knowledge of the patterns we have
found, one could fit a simpler, non-Bayesian model
to estimate the interaction between individual and
state incomes. However, one can also view our fit-
ting of a series of models as a form of exploratory
data analysis. It is only through active engagement
with the data that we got a sense of what to look
for. Thus, the flexible generality of the Bayesian ap-
proach facilitated our substantive research break-
through here.
This is the opposite of the paradigm common in
classical theoretical statistics, of laser-like focus on
identification of a single effect and a concern with
frequency properties of a prechosen statistical pro-
cedure.
Our Bayesian procedures are consistent with our
political knowledge—that is, having obtained our
estimates, we and others have been able to incor-
porate them into our understanding of income and
voting (as discussed in detail by Gelman et al., 2009,
where we consider various other factors including is-
sue attitudes and religiosity as individual-level pre-
dictors). But this sort of theoretical coherence is
not enough: social scientists are notoriously adept
at coming up with explanations to fit any set of
supposed facts. In addition, our model, as we have
developed and extended it, fits the data via graphi-
cal checks (for an example, see Figure 3, which ap-
pears near the end of this article after we have de-
scribed the model), and, perhaps convincingly, has
performed well in external validation (in that we
developed our models to fit to data from the 2000
election and then they successfully worked for 2004,
2008 and 2012).
The real world impact of this work is twofold.
First, we have established that income is more
strongly predictive of Republican voting in poor
states than in rich states, and that this difference
has arisen in the past two decades. Second, political
scientists and journalists now have a clearer view
of the relation between social, economic and polit-
ical polarization. The political differences between
“red America” and “blue America” are concentrated
among the upper half of the income distribution. By
allowing us to model a pattern of income and voting
that varies across states, Bayesian analysis allowed
us to get a grip on this important political trend.
2. BACKGROUND
For the past fifteen years or so, Americans have
been divided politically into “red states” (the con-
servative, Republican-leaning areas in the south and
middle of the country) and “blue states” (the more
urban areas in the northeast and west coast, whose
residents consistently vote for Democrats). Here is
the red-state, blue-state paradox: since the 1990s,
the poorer states have voted for conservative Re-
publicans while rich states favor liberal Democrats.
This has surprised political observers, given that Re-
publicans traditionally represent the rich with the
Democrats representing the poor. And, indeed, Re-
publican candidates do about 20 percentage points
better among rich voters than among poor voters, a
gap that has persisted for decades.
The red-state blue-state pattern became widely
apparent in the aftermath of the disputed 2000 pres-
idential election, when television viewers became
all too familiar with the iconic electoral map: blue
states on the coasts and upper midwest voting for Al
Gore, red states in the American heartland support-
ing George Bush, and Florida colored blank awaiting
the decision of the courts.
The result has confused political observers on
both sides of the political spectrum. On the right
came a much-discussed magazine article by David
Brooks, comparing Montgomery County, Maryland,
the liberal, upper-middle-class suburb where he
and his friends live, to rural, conservative Franklin
County, Pennsylvania, a short drive away but dis-
tant in attitudes and values, with “no Starbucks,
no Pottery Barn, no Borders or Barnes & Noble,”
plenty of churches but not so many Thai restaurants,
“a lot fewer sun-dried-tomato concoctions on restau-
rant menus and a lot more meatloaf platters.” On
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the left, Thomas Frank’s bestsellingWhat’s the Mat-
ter with Kansas (2004) was widely interpreted to an-
swer the question of why low-income Americans vote
Republican: “For more than thirty-five years, Amer-
ican politics has followed a populist pattern . . . the
average American, humble, long-suffering, working
hard, and paying his taxes; and the liberal elite, the
know-it-alls of Manhattan and Malibu, sipping their
lattes as they lord it over the peasantry with their
fancy college degrees and their friends in the judi-
ciary.”
Here is a summary from Gelman (2011):
Republicans, who traditionally represented
America’s elites, had dominated in lower-
income areas in the South and Midwest
and in unassuming suburbs, rather than
in America’s glittering centers of power.
What could explain this turnaround? The
most direct story—hinted at by Brooks in
his articles and books on America’s new,
cosmopolitan, liberal upper class—is that
the parties simply switched, with the new-
look Democrats representing hedge-fund
billionaires, college professors and other
urban liberals, and Republicans getting
the votes of middle-class middle Ameri-
cans. This story of partisan reversal has
received some attention from pundits. For
example, TV talk show host Tucker Carl-
son said, “Okay, but here’s the fact that
nobody ever, ever mentions—Democrats
win rich people. Over $100,000 in in-
come, you are likely more than not to
vote for Democrats. People never point
that out. Rich people vote liberal.” And
Michael Barone, the editor of the Al-
manac of American Politics, wrote that
the Democratic Party “does not run very
well among the common people.” But
Tucker Carlson and Michael Barone were
both wrong . . . obviously wrong, from the
standpoint of any political scientist who
knows opinion polls. Republican candi-
dates consistently do best among upper-
income voters and worst at the low end.
In the country as a whole and separately
among Whites, Blacks, Hispanics and oth-
ers, richer Americans are more likely to
vote Republican. . . .
Misconceptions about income and voting
are all over the place in the serious pop-
ular press. For example, James Ledbet-
ter in Slate claimed that “America’s rich
now tilt politically left in their opinions.”
In the London Review of Books, politi-
cal theorist David Runciman wrote, “It
is striking that the people who most dis-
like the whole idea of healthcare reform—
the ones who think it is socialist, godless,
a step on the road to a police state—
are often the ones it seems designed to
help. . . . Right-wing politics has become a
vehicle for channeling this popular anger
against intellectual snobs. The result is
that many of America’s poorest citizens
have a deep emotional attachment to a
party that serves the interests of its rich-
est.” No, no and no. An analysis of opin-
ion polls finds, perhaps unsurprisingly,
but in contradiction to the above claims,
that older and high-income voters are the
groups that most strongly oppose health
care reform.
It has been difficult for political journalists to
accept that richer voters prefer Republicans while
richer states lean Democratic. At first this may ap-
pear to be a simple example of the ecological fallacy:
the correlation of income with Republican voting is
negative at the aggregate level and positive at the
individual level. And, indeed, part of the problem
is a simple and familiar difficulty of statistical un-
derstanding, associated with people assuming that
aggregates (in this case, states) have the proper-
ties of individuals. This misunderstanding is partic-
ularly relevant from a political perspective because
the United States has a federal system of govern-
ment, with some policies determined nationally and
others at the state level. Thus, individual prefer-
ences and state averages are both important in con-
sidering politics and policy in this country.
3. STATISTICAL MODEL AND BAYESIAN
INFERENCE: OVERVIEW
It turns out that the statistical story is more com-
plicated too. Red states and blue states do not only
differ in their political complexions; in addition, the
relation between income and voting varies systemat-
ically by state. In richer, liberal states such as New
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York and California, there is essentially no correla-
tion between income and voting—rich and poor vote
the same way—while in conservative states such as
Texas, the rich are much more Republican than the
poor. Political divisions by social class look different
in red and blue America.
This key statistical part of our analysis is the es-
timation of the relation between income and voting
(later including religious attendance and ethnicity
as additional explanatory factors) separately in each
state. This is difficult because even a large national
survey will not have a huge sample size in all fifty
states—and recall that we are not merely estimating
an average in each state but we are attempting to
estimate a regression or even a nonlinear functional
relationship. Political scientists armed with conven-
tional statistical tools sometimes try to get around
this sample size problem by pooling data from mul-
tiple years—but this would not work here because
we are also interested in changes over time.
The Bayesian resolution was a multilevel model al-
lowing different patterns of income and voting in dif-
ferent states. The model was built on a hierarchical
logistic regression but included error terms at every
level so that the ultimate fit was not constrained to
fall along any parametric curve. Because of the com-
plexity of our model, it was necessary to check its fit
by comparing data to posterior simulations. Classi-
cal approaches—even classical multilevel models—
would not fully express the uncertainty in the fit. In
contrast, our Bayesian approach not only allowed us
to fit the data, it also provided a structure for us to
consider a series of different models to explore the
data.
In general, estimating state-level patterns from
national polls requires two tasks: survey weighting
or adjustment for known differences between sam-
ple and population (for example, surveys tend to
overrepresent women, whites and older Americans,
while underrepresenting young male ethnic minori-
ties), and small-area estimation or regularized esti-
mates for subsets where raw-data averages would be
too noisy.
In order to estimate the pattern of income and
voting within each state, we used the strategy of
multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP),
a general approach to survey inference for subsets
of the population that has two steps:
1. Use a multilevel model to estimate the distribu-
tion of the outcome of interest (in this case, vote
preference, among those people who plan to vote
in the presidential election) given demographic
and geographic predictors which divide the popu-
lation into categories. Here we start with 250 cells
(5 income categories within each of 50 states); a
later model considers four ethnicity categories as
well, and, more generally, the analysis could cate-
gorize people by sex, age, income, marital status,
religion, religious attendance and so on, easily
leading to more cells than survey respondents. It
is the job of the Bayesian model to come up with
a reasonable inference for the joint distribution of
the Republican vote share within whatever cate-
gories are included.
2. Poststratify to sum the inferences across cells.
For example, the estimated percentage of sup-
port for Obama among Hispanics in the midwest
is simply the weighted average of his estimated
support within each of the relevant poststratifi-
cation cells (in the ethnicity/income/state model,
this would be one cell for each income category
within each midwestern state). The weights in
this weighted average are simply the number of
voters in each cell, which we can get from the
U.S. Census. (To obtain voter weights is itself a
two-stage process in which we first take the num-
ber of adult Americans in each cell, then multiply
within each cell by the proportion of adults who
voted, as estimated from a multilevel logistic re-
gression fit to a Census post-election survey that
asks about voting behavior; again, see Ghitza and
Gelman (2013), for details.)
It is clear how MRP fits in with Bayesian statis-
tics: the number of observations per cell is small, so
our problem is one of small-area estimation (Fay and
Herriot (1979)), hence, it makes sense to partially
pool inferences, averaging local data and a larger
fitted regression model. Bayesian inference is a well-
recognized tool for combining local information with
predictions from a stochastic model (Clayton and
Kaldor (1987)).
But it may be less obvious how our method con-
nects with the vast literature on survey weighting,
a field that traditionally draws a strong distinction
between “model-based” procedures such as Bayesian
or even likelihood methods that posit a probabil-
ity model for the data and “design-based” inference
which leave data unmodeled and apply a probability
distribution only to the sampling process. The con-
nection was made clear by Little (1991, 1993), who
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showed how model-based inference fits in a larger
design-based framework (or, conversely, how design-
based inferences are possible within a larger proba-
bility model). Little’s key insight is centered on the
poststratification identity :
θ =
∑
jNjθj∑
jNj
,
where θ is some aggregate quantity of interest (for
example, the estimated support for Obama among
Hispanics in the midwest), j’s are the cells within
this aggregate, Nj is the population size of each cell
(in our case, obtained from the Census), and θj is
the (unknown) population quantity with the cell.
As noted, the above equation is a tautology. Its
connection to statistical inference comes in the in-
ferences for the θj ’s. Assuming simple random sam-
pling within cells (the implied basis for classical sur-
vey weighting), one can estimate the θj ’s through
simple raw cell means (statistically inefficient if sam-
ple sizes are small) or more effectively via regression
modeling which quickly leads to Bayes if the number
of cells is large and the model is realistically com-
plex. The information that would go into classical
survey weights instead enters our MRP calculations
through the population sizes Nj . This is important:
you can’t get something for nothing, and the cost
of our poststratified lunch is the array of population
numbers Nj .
MRP combines long-existing ideas in sample sur-
veys but has become recently popular as a way
to learn about state-level opinions from national
polls (Gelman and Little (1997); Lax and Phillips
(2009a,b)), perhaps as a result of increasing ease of
handling large data sets as well as improvements
in off-the-shelf hierarchical modeling tools. In many
political science applications, state averages are of
primary interest, and we estimate opinion in within-
state slices (for example, white women aged 30–44
in Missouri) only because we feel we need to, in or-
der to adjust for differential nonresponse. We fit
the multilevel model to get reasonable inferences
within all these cells but then immediately post-
stratify to get state-level estimates. All these steps
are needed—a simple Bayesian analysis of state-level
data would fail to adjust for known demographic
differences between sample and population. Modern
surveys have large problems with nonrepresentative-
ness and some sort of adjustment is necessary to
match the population. MRP forms a bridge between
Bayesian inference (so flexible and powerful for es-
timating large numbers of parameters and making
large numbers of uncertain predictions at once) and
classical survey adjustment (given that real surveys
can be clearly nonrepresentative of the population).
This latter step is crucial in many applications in
which data are combined from many disparate sur-
veys.
In the Red State Blue State project, MRP plays
a slightly different role. Here we actually are in-
terested in categories within a state (initially, the
five income categories; later, voters cross-classified
by income, education and religious attendance). The
poststratification is less important here (although it
does come up: after we sum our inferences over cells
within each state, we adjust our predictions of state-
level averages to line up with actual recorded vote
totals, a completely reasonable step given this addi-
tional information separate from the survey data).
What is relevant for the present discussion is that
our method harnesses the power of Bayes within a
framework that accounts for concerns specific to sur-
vey sampling.
4. STATISTICAL MODEL AND BAYESIAN
INFERENCE: DETAILS
We fit our models separately to pre-election poll
data from 2000, 2004 and 2008, with about 20–
40,000 respondents in each year. This sample size
is large enough for us to estimate variation among
states but not so large that we could just estimate
each state’s pattern using its own data alone. An
intermediate approach would be to combine simi-
lar states, although one would not want to combine
completely, and it would then make sense to fit a
regression model to determine which states to com-
bine, and also set some rule based on sample size to
decide how much to pool each state . . . and this all
leads to a multilevel regression.
For the purposes of learning about opinion from a
sample, the multilevel model is a way to obtain es-
timates for mutually exclusive slices of the popula-
tion (and implicitly corresponds to the assumption
that the respondents being analyzed are a simple
random sample within each cell). From the perspec-
tive of statistical inference, however, our model is
simply a hierarchical regression with discrete pre-
dictors. Thus, if we want to perform inference for 4
ethnicities × 5 income categories × 50 states, we just
need to include predictors for ethnicities, income lev-
els and states (along with various interactions), and
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perform inferences for the vector of regression coeffi-
cients, and inferences for the 1000 cells just pop out
as predictions from the fitted regression model.
The most basic form of the model is a varying-
intercept logistic regression of survey responses:
Pr(yi = 1) = logit
−1(αj[i]+Xiβ),
where:
• yi = 1 if respondent i intends to vote for the Re-
publican candidate for president or 0 if he or she
supports the Democrat (with those expressing no
opinion excluded from the analysis),
• αj[i] is a varying intercept for the state j[i] where
the respondent lives (that is, j[i] is an index tak-
ing on a value between 1 and 50),
• Xi is a vector of demographic predictors (indica-
tors for state, age, ethnicity, education and some
of their interactions, and also income, discretized
on a scale of −2,−1,0,1,2), and β is a vector of
estimated coefficients.
The intercepts αj are themselves modeled by a re-
gression:
αj ∼N(Wjγ,σ
2
α),
where:
• Wj is a vector of state-level predictors (including
average income of the residents of the state, Re-
publican vote share in the previous presidential
election and indicators for region of the country),
• γ is a vector of state-level coefficients, and
• σα is the standard deviation of the unexplained
state-level variance.
We completed the Bayesian model by assigning to
the otherwise unmodeled parameters β, γ, σα a uni-
form prior distributions: in retrospect, not the best
choice (we do in fact have prior information on these
quantities, starting with results from the model fit
to earlier elections) but enough to give us reason-
able results. As this work goes forward we plan to
think harder about hyperprior distributions and ad-
ditional levels of the hierarchy such as building in
time-series models.
The varying-intercept model above fails because
it assumes a constant relation between income and
voting across states. Actually, the data show that
income is much more highly correlated with Repub-
lican voting in some states than others. We fit this
pattern using a model in which the intercept and the
coefficient for individual income varies by state. The
two varying coefficients within each state are then
themselves modeled given state-level predictors and
with a 2 × 2 covariance matrix for the state-level
errors. (We coded income as −2 to 2 rather than
1–5 so that the joint distribution of intercept and
slope would be easier to model, following standard
practice in regressions with interactions.) Figure 1
shows the models with constant slope and then with
income coefficients varying by state. This new model
fit reasonably well but we further elaborated it by
adding varying coefficients for each income category,
thus allowing a nonlinear relation (on the logistic
scale) of income and vote preference that could vary
by state and ethnicity. Income is included in this re-
gression in three ways at once, but because of the hi-
erarchical Bayesian model there is no multicollinear-
ity problem.
Other versions of the model include additional
individual-level predictors such as age, education
and religious attendance. For some polls that are
“self-weighting” or approximately so—this refers
to surveys where adjustments are made within
the sampling process to minimize demographic dif-
ferences between sample and population—we also
sometimes fit models with fewer individual predic-
tors. Ideally it makes sense to include important
predictors such as sex, age and ethnicity in the
poststratification to correct for sampling bias and
variance in these dimensions, but for simplicity in
computation and analysis we have also fit models
including only income as a respondent-level vari-
able.
The different pieces of the Bayesian predictive
model for vote preferences connect in different ways
to our statistical and substantive goals. Adjustments
for sex, age, ethnicity and education correspond to
survey weighting for these variables to correct for
important known differences between sample and
population. Including individual income as a predic-
tor serves the goal of comparing the votes of rich and
poor within states, while including state income as a
group-level predictor allows us to compare rich and
poor states. Finally, the varying-intercept model for
state with its error term allows unexplained varia-
tion among states, which is crucial because we know
that states vary in many other ways beyond that
predicted by state income levels. The final model
can be written in the form
E(y) within cell j = logit−1(Wjγ),
where j indexes the poststratification cell (states ×
demographic variables), W is a matrix of indica-
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Fig. 1. The evolution of a simple model of vote choice in the 2008 election for state × income subgroups, non-Hispanic whites
only. The colors come from the 2008 election, with darker shades of red and blue for states that had larger margins in favor
of McCain or Obama, respectively. The first panel shows the raw data; the middle panel is a hierarchical model where state
coefficients vary but the (linear) income coefficient is held constant across states; the right panel allows the income coefficient
to vary by state. Adding complexity to the model reveals weaknesses in inferences drawn from simpler versions of the model.
The poorest state (Mississippi), a middle-income state (Ohio), and the richest state (Connecticut) are highlighted to show
important trends. From Ghitza and Gelman (2013).
tor variables, and γ is a vector of logistic regression
coefficients which themselves are modeled hierarchi-
cally, with batches of main effects and interactions.
In the Bayesian analysis, posterior simulations are
obtained on γ, which in turn induces a posterior
distribution on the cell means, which are then com-
bined by weighting with census numbers to obtain
estimates for any subsets of the population. Figure 2
shows the resulting estimates of vote preferences by
state, ethnicity and income for the 2008 presidential
election.
The poststratification step points to a differ-
ence between our Bayesian solution and traditional
statistical analyses. Even our basic model had many
parameters but none of them mapped directly to
our summaries of interest. To obtain the relation
between income and voting within a state, we did
not look at the coefficient for the income predictor.
Rather, we used our model to estimate opinion in
each poststratification cell and then summed up to
infer about each income category within each state.
Similarly, we compare rich and poor states not by
focusing on the coefficient of state income in the
group-level regression but by using MRP to esti-
mate the slope in each of the 50 states and then
plotting the estimates vs. state income. The indi-
vidual and state-level income coefficients are rele-
vant to the model, but our ultimate inferences are
constructed from pieced-together predictions. This
sort of simulation-based inference may seem awk-
ward to classically-trained statisticians but its flexi-
bility makes it ideal for problems in political science
where we are interested in studying variation rather
than in estimating some sort of universal constant
such as the speed of light. In addition, simulation-
based estimates can be directly and easily expressed
on the probability scale; there is no need to try
to interpret log-odds or logistic regression coeffi-
cients.
5. GAINS FROM BAYES
Income and voting had been studied by politi-
cal scientists for decades, but it was only through
Bayesian methods that we were able to discover the
different patterns of income and voting in rich and
poor states, an important and exciting pattern that
had never been noticed before. At a technical level,
our approach also accounted for the design of the
survey data by adjusting for demographic factors
that were used in survey weighting.
Often the key to a statistical method is not what
it does with the data but, rather, what data it allows
8 A. GELMAN
Fig. 2. Estimated two-party vote share for John McCain in the 2009 presidential election, as estimated using multilevel
modeling and poststratification from pre-election polls. Figure 3 displays some graphical diagnostics for comparing this fitted
model to data. From Gelman, Lee and Ghitza (2010a).
one to use. MRP combines design-based and model-
based inference and can handle data from multiple
surveys as well as census totals on demographics.
As always, Bayesian inference works well with mod-
els with large numbers of parameters, allowing ad-
justment for many factors, which is another way of
including more information in the inferential pro-
cedure. The complexity of the resulting inferences
make it particularly important to graphically check
the fit of model to data, as demonstrated in Fig-
ure 3.
We consider any multilevel model here to be
Bayesian, even if it takes the form of a classical
mixed-model in which the fixed effects and hier-
archical variance parameters are estimated using
marginal maximum likelihood. In the context of us-
ing surveys to estimate public opinion in geographic
and demographic slices of the population, the in-
ferences for quantities of interest are constructed
from the estimated joint predictive distribution of
the cell expectations. This summary of knowledge in
the form of a probability distribution is the essence
of Bayesian inference.
That said, we believe that an analysis just as good
as ours could be constructed entirely using non-
Bayesian methods. It would require a lot of extra
work (for us) but it should be possible. In fact, many
of the patterns we discovered (most notably, that
income predicts Republican voting better in rich
states than in poor states, and that religious atten-
dance predicts Republican voting better among rich
than poor voters) appear directly in the raw data—if
you know to look for them. In that sense, multilevel
Bayesian modeling (adapted to the sample survey
context using poststratification) can be considered
as an elaborate form of exploratory data analysis,
giving us the chance to see patterns of complex in-
teractions that are in the data but would not appear
in simple regression models.
The key pieces in the Bayesian inference were:
(a) weighted averages for small-area estimation;
(b) poststratification, which detached the modeling
stage of the analysis from the inferences for quan-
tities of interest; (c) state-level predictors, which
gave us reasonable estimates even for small states;
(d) individual-level income included as a continuous
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Fig. 3. Share of the two-party vote received by John McCain in each income category within each state among all voters
(gray) and non-Hispanic whites (orange). Dots are weighted averages from pooled survey data from the five months before the
election; error bars show ±1 standard error bounds. Curves are estimated using multilevel models and have a standard error
of about 3% at each point. States are ordered in decreasing order of McCain vote share (Alaska, Hawaii and the District of
Columbia excluded). From Ghitza and Gelman (2013).
and discrete variable at the same time, allowing a
nonparametric form for the income–voting relation
but partially pooling to linearity; (e) and flexibility
in modeling, letting us see the data and examine the
problem from many different angles without the bur-
den of requiring a fully-specified model. In standard
statistical theory—Bayesian or otherwise—a model
is either already built or is one of some discrete
class of candidate models. In this sort of applied
exploration, however, the model is always evolving,
and it is helpful to have a statistical and computa-
tional framework in which we can explore different
possibilities. The Bayesian framework is particularly
open-ended in that adding complexity to the model
is just a matter of adding parameters in the joint
posterior distribution.
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6. MOVING FORWARD
Our book that built upon the analysis described
above has changed how journalists and political pro-
fessionals think about the social and political bases
of support for America’s two major political parties.
For example, in 2009, political journalist and former
presidential speechwriter David Frum described our
book as “must reading”:
At first glance, American voting seems
topsy-turvy. Super-wealthy communities
like Beverly Hills, Aspen, and the Upper
East Side of Manhattan vote Democratic.
Meanwhile, Appalachia and Alaska are
becoming ever more Republican. Repub-
licans accuse the Democrats of “elitism.”
Liberals wonder “what’s the matter with
Kansas” and suspect low-income voters
are either gullible or racist. Gelman de-
constructs the paradox. . . .Most of us
have the notion that issues such as abor-
tion, same-sex marriage and immigration
divide a more liberal, more permissive
elite from a more traditionalist voting
base: Bob Reiner vs. Joe the Plumber. Not
so, says Gelman, and he has numbers to
prove it. Downmarket voters are bread-
and-butter voters. It is upper America
that is divided on social issues: a more
permissive, more liberal elite in the North-
east and California and a more religious,
more conservative elite in the South and
Midwest. It’s not Hollywood vs. Wassila.
It’s Hollywood vs. the wealthy suburbs of
Dallas and Houston and Atlanta.
This new understanding is, we hope, replacing the
more simplistic attitudes of rich Democrats and
down-to-earth Republicans as expressed by various
pundits in Section 2 of this article.
The success of our red-state–blue-state analysis
also motivated ourselves and others to apply MRP
in a variety of settings to understand local attitudes
and to integrate demographic and geographic mod-
eling in social science, on topics related to health
care (Gelman, Lee and Ghitza (2010b)), capital pun-
ishment (Shirley and Gelman (2014)), gay rights
(Lax and Phillips (2009a)) and more general ques-
tions of the relation between state-level opinion and
state policies (Lax and Phillips (2012)). To the ex-
tent that public opinion can be estimated at the
state level and this is done for topical issues, this
can inform public debate, as, for example, with the
recent Senate vote on the Employment Nondiscrim-
ination Act (Lax and Phillips (2013)).
On a more methodological level, many statistical
challenges remain with MRP, most notably how to
build and compute models with many predictive fac-
tors (age, ethnicity, education, family structure, . . . )
and correspondingly huge numbers of interactions,
how to visualize such model fits, and how to post-
stratify on characteristics such as religious atten-
dance that are not known in the population. More
generally, our increasing ability to fit large statisti-
cal models puts more of a burden on checking and
understanding these models. Given that a mere two-
way model of income and state turned out to be
complicated enough to require a multi-year research
project, we anticipate new challenges in digesting
larger models that allow more accurate inferences
from sample to population.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Partially supported by the National Science Foun-
dation and Institute of Education Sciences. We
thank Yair Ghitza and two reviewers for help-
ful comments, and Christian Robert and Kerrie
Mengersen for organizing this special issue.
REFERENCES
Clayton, D. G. andKaldor, J. M. (1987). Empirical Bayes
estimates of age-standardized relative risks for use in dis-
ease mapping. Biometrics 43 671–682.
Fay, R. E. III and Herriot, R. A. (1979). Estimates of in-
come for small places: An application of James–Stein pro-
cedures to census data. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 74 269–277.
MR0548019
Frum, D. (2009). Red state, blue state, rich state, poor state.
Frum Forum. Available at http://www.frumforum.com/
red-state-blue-state-rich-state-poor-state/.
Gelman, A. (2011). Economic divisions and political polar-
ization in red and blue America. Pathways Summer 3–6.
Gelman, A., Lee, D. and Ghitza, Y. (2010a). A snapshot
of the 2008 election. Statistics, Politics and Policy 1 Article
3.
Gelman, A., Lee, D. and Ghitza, Y. (2010b). Public opin-
ion on health care reform. The Forum 8 Article 8.
Gelman, A. and Little, T. C. (1997). Poststratification
into many categories using hierarchical logistic regression.
Survey Methodology 23 127–135.
Gelman, A., Park, D., Shor, B. and Cortina, J. (2009).
Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Ameri-
cans Vote the Way They Do, 2nd ed. Princeton Univ. Press,
Princeton, NJ.
HOW BAYESIAN ANALYSIS CRACKED THE RED-STATE, BLUE-STATE PROBLEM 11
Ghitza, Y. and Gelman, A. (2013). Deep interactions with
MRP: Election turnout and voting patterns among small
electoral subgroups. American Journal of Political Science
57 762–776.
Lax, J. and Phillips, J. (2009a). Gay rights in the states:
Public opinion and policy responsiveness. American Polit-
ical Science Review 103 367–386.
Lax, J. and Phillips, J. (2009b). How should we estimate
public opinion in the states? American Journal of Political
Science 53 107–121.
Lax, J. and Phillips, J. (2012). The democratic deficit in
the states. American Journal of Political Science 56 148–
166.
Lax, J. and Phillips, J. (2013). Memo to Senate Repub-
licans: Your constituents want you to vote for ENDA.
Monkey Cage blog, Washington Post. Available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2013/
11/03/memo-to-senate-republicans-your-constituents-want-
you-to-vote-for-enda/.
Little, R. J. A. (1991). Inference with survey weights. Jour-
nal of Official Statistics 7 405–424.
Little, R. J. A. (1993). Post-stratification: A modeler’s per-
spective. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 88 1001–1012.
Shirley, K. E. and Gelman, A. (2014). Hierarchical models
for estimating state and demographic trends in U.S. death
penalty public opinion. J. Roy. Statist. Soc. A. To appear.
